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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. (together 
"Maple Grove") appeal from the district court's dismissal of their lawsuit against the Ada 
County Highway District ("ACHD). Maple Grove claims business damages from ACHD under 
Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) based upon the taking of real property that ACHD needed for its Ustick 
Road widening project in Boise. 
11. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Maple Grove filed its Complaint against ACHD on September 14,2007, seeking 
declaratory relief and damages. R., p. 7. Maple G~ove alleged that it was entitled to declaratory 
judgment that it was a qualifying business under Idaho Code § 7-71 I(2) and could therefore 
recover its business damages resulting from ACHD's acquisition of property for a public 
purpose, and that it was entitled to a jury trial to determine the amount of those damages. Maple 
Grove further claimed that it was entitled to recover its relocation expenses under Idaho Code $ 
40-2004. 
In response to the Complaint, ACHD filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Maple Grove 
improperly combined its request for declaratory relief with a claim for damages, and that Maple 
Grove failed to follow the proper administrative procedures with regard to its claim under Idaho 
Code $40-2004. R., p. 13. The district court, in a Decision and Order dated February 19, 2008, 
denied the motion to dismiss as to Maple Grove's claims for declaratory relief and damages 
under ldaho Code $ 7-71 l(2) and granted the motion as to the claim under Idaho Code 5 40- 
2004. R., p. 3 1. During argument on the motion to dismiss, the parties debated whether the 
action was properly described as one for inverse condemnation. In the Decision and Order, the 
trial court did not address the issue but observed that it had "questions about whether the 
Plaintiffs have a cornpensable interest and a right to recover under I.C. 5 7-71 1 . . . ." R., p. 41. 
In order to address those questions, on August 11,2008, Maple Grove filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling from the district court as to Maple Grove's right to 
recover damages as a qualifying business under Idaho Code 5 7-71 1. R., p. 43. Maple Grove 
also argued that, to the extent that it was required to establish the elements of an inverse 
condemnation claim in order to recover, it could do so by virtue of its leasehold interest in 
portions of the property acquired for public use.' ACHD argued in opposition that Maple Grove 
did not have a right to bring an action for damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) because such a 
claim could only he made in the context of an eminent domain or inverse condemnation action. 
R., p. 46. ACHD also argued that Maple Grove did not possess a property interest sufficient to 
support an inverse condemnation claim, and that no taking of any property occurred because 
ACHD was able to negotiate a purchase ofthe real property with the landowner. Id 
In a Decision and Order dated January 22, 2009, the district court denied Maple Grove's 
motion for summary judgment holding that Maple Grove did not possess a property interest that 
was the subject of a taking, and that Maple Grove was not entitled to business damages under 
Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) because the property was acquired by ACHD via purchase. R., p. 98. 
' Maple Grove also amended its Complaint in order to state an inverse condemnation claim in addition to 
the statutory claim for business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2). R., p. 7 3 .  
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Pursuant to a motion by ACHD, the district court entered judgment against Maple Grove on 
February 10,2009. R., p. 113. 
Maple Grove filed its Motion for Reconsideration of Decision and Order and for 
Withdrawal of Judgment on February 24,2009. R., p. 117. Following briefing and oral 
argument, the district court granted the motion for withdrawal of the February 10,2009 judgment 
(R., p. 137), denied the motion for reconsideration (R., p. 139), and, on May 20,2009, entered a 
Final Judgment in favor of ACHD, dismissing all of Maple Grove's claims with prejudice (R., p. 
141). Maple Grove timely filed its Notice of Appeal on July 1,2009. R., p. 145. Maple Grove 
appeals the trial court's decisions concerning its claim for damages under Idaho Code 5 7- 
71 1(2).' 
111. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Jack D. Klure D.D.S. ("Dr. Klure") and Thomas R. Curtis, D.D.S. ("Dr. Curtis.") owned 
and operated Maple Grove Dentistry as equal partners. R., Exh. 6,77 1-2. Pursuant to a lease 
agreement between Dr. Curtis and Maple Grove (the "Maple Grove Lease"), Maple Grove leased 
an office building and real property located at 3224 North Maple Grove Road, Boise, Idaho for 
its dental practice from Dr. Curtis. R., Exh. 6,T 4. Maple Grove operated the dental practice at 
that location for more than ten (10) years before Ada County Highway District ("ACHD") 
acquired the property. R., Exh. 6,T 5. 
In late 2005, ACHD moved forward with a constluction project to widen Ustick Road 
between Five Mile Road and Cole Road (the "Project"). R., Exh. 7,T 17. Completion of the 
Maple Grove does not appeal the trial court's dismissal of its claim for relocation costs under Idaho 
Code $40-2004. 
Project required ACHD to acquire private property along Ustick Road, including a strip of 
property adjacent to the office building where Maple Grove was located. R., Exh. 7 ,7  20-22. 
Until the Project, Dr. Klure and Dr. Curtis intended to practice at the Maple Grove location until 
they retired. R., Exh. 9, '// 4. The facility was state of the art, with six fully equipped patient 
rooms. R., Exh. 9,75.  However, it was apparent to Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure that the Project 
would result in the Maple Grove location being unsuitable for a dentistry practice due to the 
traffic being very close to the building and the new configuration of the lanes and driveways. R., 
Exh. 9,77 2,3  and 6. Both Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure decided to relocate their practices based 
upon the changes to the location caused by the Project. R., Exh. 6 ,  77 7-8; R., Exh. 9 ,7  4. 
In June of 2007, Dr. Curtis entered into a settlement agreement with ACHD (the 
"ACHDICurtis Settlement"). R., Exh. 6,7 8. To facilitate the ACHDICurtis Settlement, ACHD 
acquired more real property than it needed to complete the Project. The ACHDICurtis 
Settlement provided just compensation for Dr. Curtis' fee interest in the property and settled all 
of Dr. Curtis' claims arising from Dr. Curtis' fifty percent (50%) interest in Maple Grove, 
including a claim for business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 1. Id 
Dr. Klure did not benefit from the ACHDICurtis Settlemei~t. In fact, the ACHDICurtis 
Settlement specifically excluded all claims by Dr. Klure and his fifty percent (50%) interest in 
Maple Grove. Id. Maple Grove continued to operate in its original location until Dr. Klure 
relocated his practice in April of 2007 and Dr. Curtis relocated his practice in June of 2007. R., 
Exh. 7,77 62-64. 
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Maple Grove's leasehold interest in the property was terminated upon ACHD's 
acquisition of the property. R., Exh. 6, '1[ 4. According to the Maple Grove Lease, the Premises 
consisted of the lands and improvements located on Lot 19 Block 1 of Fairbanks Subdivision, 
according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 55 of Plats at page 4987-4988, Records of 
Ada County Idaho. Id ,  Art.2.1 and Exh. A. 
Article 14.1 of the Maple Grove Lease states in relevant part: 
14.1 Entire or Substantial Taking. If the entire Premises, or so 
much thereof as to make the balance not reasonably adequate for 
the conduct of Tenant's business, notwithstanding restoration by 
Landlord hereinafter provided, shall be taken under the power of 
eminent domain, this Lease shall automatically terminate as of the 
date on which condemning authority takes title or possession, 
whichever first occurs. 
Correspondingly, Article 14.4 of the Maple Grove Lease states: 
14.4 Sale Under Threat of Condemnation. A sale by Landlord of 
the Premises either under threat of condemnation or while 
condemnation proceedings are pending, shall be deemed a taking 
under the power of eminent domain for all purposes of this section. 
ACHD appropriated the property when it entered into the ACHDiCurtis Settlement. 
Section B. 1 of the ACHDiCurtis Settlement provides: 
ACHD shall pay Curtis the sum of One Million Ninety Five 
Thousand and No/lOOths Dollars ($1,095,000.00) as just 
compensation and in full, complete and final settlement of any and 
all claims by Curtis, including their interest in [Maple Grove], and 
any and all damages suffered by Curtis, including their interest in 
[Maple Grove], of any kind or nature arising out of or relating in 
any way to the Project andlor to ACHD's acquisition of the 
- aforementioned real properties described in Exhibits A, B and C 
hereto, and including necessary construction easements associated 
with the Project. 
R., Exh. 6,7 8. In exchange for this payment Dr. Curtis agreed to convey the property to ACHD. 
Id, section G. ACHD's acquisition of the property terminated Maple Grove's leasehold estate. 
Under the terms of the Maple Grove Lease, Dr. Curtis, as the landlord, was entitled to 
any award for the taking of all or part of the property. However, Article 14.3 of the Maple Grove 
Lease specifically states that: 
14.3 Awards. Any award for any taking of all or any par% of the 
Premises under the power of eminent domain shall be the property 
of Landlord, whether such award shall be made as compensation 
for diminution in value of the leasehold or for the taking of the fee; 
provided that nothing contained herein, however, shall be 
deemed to preclude [Maple Grove] from obtaining and 
keeping, or  to give Landlord any interest in, any award to 
[Maple Grove] for loss of or  damage to [Maple Grove's] trade 
fixtures and removable personal property or for damage for 
cessation or interruption of [Maple Grove's] business, or  for 
relocation costs or for the portion of such award as is allocable 
to leasehold improvements constructed or  paid for by [Maple 
Grove]. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The ACHDICurtis Settlement correctly compensated Dr. Curtis for, among other things, 
his fee simple interest in the property (including the real property actually used in the Project) 
and that part of Maple Grove's business damages attributable to his ownership interest in Maple 
Grove. In exchange, ACHD took possession of the property. However, this all occurred without 
Dr. Klure receiving compensation for his portion of Maple Grove's business damages. 
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Maple Grove attempted to negotiate a settlement with ACHD for the damage to Dr. 
Klure's interest in Maple Grove but ACHD refused to compensate Maple Grove for any damages 
the Project caused Dr. Klure or his interest in Maple Grove. R., Exh. 6,7 11. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Maple Grove is a qualifying business entitled to recover business 
damages under Idaho Code § 7-71 l(2). 
2. Whether a taking of property occurred that triggered application of the business 
damages provisions of Idaho Code § 7-71 1(2). 
3. Whether a taking of any property interest of Maple Grove occurred in connection 
with the Project. 
4. Whether Maple Grove can recover its relocation costs under Idaho Code 5 7- 
711(2). 
5. Whether the district court erred in denying Maple Grove's motion for partial 
summary judgment and its motion for reconsideration, and by entering judgment in favor of 
ACHD and dismissing Maple Grove's claims with prejudice. 
6. Whether Appellant is entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-71 8, 
I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(l)(B) and Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 
P.2d 1067 (1983). 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. Maple Grove is Entitled to Business Damages Under Idaho Code § 7-711. 
The Idaho Legislature has provided for the compensation of certain business owners that 
are damaged by the taking of property for public uses. Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) entitles any 
person or entity meeting its requirements to recover business damages. That statute requires the 
fact finder to ascertain and assess: 
[Tlhe damages to any business qualifying under this subsection 
having more than five (5) years' standing which a taking of a 
portion of the property and the construction of the improvement in 
the manner proposed by the plaintiff may reasonably cause. 
Idaho Code § 7-71 l(2). 
The Legislature's decision to require the payment of damages to qualifying businesses is 
independent of the right to receive compensation for a taking. The business damages provision 
was at issue in City ofMcCall v. Seubert, wherein this Court stated: 
. . . [Tlhe City's argument that an interest in remaining on the land 
sufficient to claim business damages must be proven by a written 
lease or agreement attempts to import a requirement into the statute 
that does not exist. A business need only meet the statutory 
requirements of I.C. 5 7-711 in order to make a claim for 
damages resulting from the taking of the underlying property. 
"The right to receive business damages . . . resulting from a taking 
of land is strictly a statutory right . . . ." 29A C.J.S. Eminent 
Domain 5 150 (2004). 
City ofMcCall v. Seuberf, 142 Idaho 580,584,130 P.3d 1118, 1122 (2006) (emphasis added). 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 8 
The Seubert court analyzed section 7-71 1's statutory requirements to entitlement to 
business damages. The business must be on the property being taken for more than five years. 
Seubert, 130 P.3d at 1122. Once the duration of the business' occupancy has been established: 
There are two independent ways to qualify under I.C. 5 7-71 l(2): 
'[Tlhe business must be owned by the party whose lands are being 
condemned or be located upon adjoining lands owned or held by 
such party.' 
Seubert, 130 P.3d at 1122. 
In this case, Maple Grove clearly satisfies the five year standing requirement where it 
operated on the Property for over ten years. There is simply no requirement that Maple Grove 
must prove a taking of its property in order to recover under the statute. Instead, all that is 
necessary is that Maple Grove proves that it qualifies under the explicit terms of the statute. In 
fact, Maple Grove qualifies for business damages under both prongs of section 7-71 l(2). 
B. As an equal partner, Dr. Curtis' ownership of the Property is sufficient to support 
Maple Grove's entire claim for business damages under Idaho Code 8 7-711. 
To qualify for business damages, "[tlhe business must be owned by the party whose lands 
are being condemned . . . ." Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2). An award for the full amount of a 
business's damages is appropriate under this statute where a majority owner of the business also 
owns the property being condemned. Seubert, 130 P.3d at 1122-1 123. 
In Seubert, one of the individual defendants was the majority shareholder of Valley 
Asphalt & Paving, Inc. ("Valley"). When the government brought its eminent domain action, 
Valley intervened as a party to the action and asserted claims for business damages. Seubert, 
130 P.3d at 1121. This Court upheld the district court's decision to award Valley business 
damages over the government's argument that Valley had no legally compensable interest in the 
property. 
The Seubert court specifically held that Valley satisfied the first prong of Idaho Code 5 7- 
71 l(2) which requires the business to be owned by the party whose property is being 
condemned. This Court said: 
Valley satisfies the f ls t  prong of I.C. 5 7-71 l(2) that allows 
compensation to be paid to a business 'owned by the party whose 
lands are being condemned.' Valley is effectively owned by 
Seubert as Cherie Seubert is the majority owner of Valley and 
thereby controls the corporation. * * * Valley U clearly meet[s] 
the requirements of I.C. 5 7-71 1 and therefore, [is] entitled to make 
a claim for business damages. 
130 P.3d at 1122-1 123. This Court did NOT restrict recovery to only Mrs. Seubert's interest in 
Valley, but instead held that Valley, as a separate legal entity, was entitled to make an 
independent claim for any business damages it suffered as a result of the condemnation. 
In this case, Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure are equal partners in Maple Grove. Dr. Curtis 
stands in the shoes of Mrs. Seubert as a party that owned both the property being condemned and 
a controlling interest in the entity seeking business damages. Dr. Klure stands in the same 
position as Valley's minority shareholders. The Seubert court held that the award for Valley's 
business damages was appropriate. Since Maple Grove is owned by the party whose lands were 
condemned it is entitled to business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2). ACHD recognized 
this entitlement when it settled Dr. Curtis's claim for business damages in the ACHDlCurtis 
Settlement. Now, Dr. Klure is entitled to his portion of those damages which were specifically 
excluded from the ACHDlCurtis Settlement 
C. . Maple Grove is entitled to its business damages because it was located on land 
owned by Dr. Curtis that adjoins the Condemned Property which was owned by Dr. 
Curtis. 
Businesses that are located on: (1) land adjoining the condemned piece of property; and 
(2) on land owned by the condernnee; qualify for business damages under the second prong of 
Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2). Seubert, 130 P.3d at 1123. 
Clearwater Concrete, Inc. ("Clearwater") was another intervenor in Seubert that was 
awarded business damages by the trial court. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld Clearwater's 
claim under the second prong of Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2). Seubert, 130 P.3d at 1122-1 123. 
Cleanuater's business was located on Seubert's properly. Seubert, 130 P.3d at 1121. After the 
condemnation, Clearwater was located on a remaining portion of Seubert's property which was 
adjacent to the condemned property. Seubert, 130 P.3d at 1123. Accordingly, this Court held 
that "Clearwater clearly meet[s] the requirements of LC. 5 7-71 1 and therefore, [is] entitled to 
make a claim for business damages." Seubert, 130 P.3d at 1123. 
Here, Maple Grove was located on land owned by Dr. Curtis. The land upon which 
Maple Grove was located is adjacent to the property used in the Project. The property actually 
used in the project was also owned by Dr. Curtis. Therefore, Maple Grove is entitled to recover 
the full amount of its business damages. 
Dr. Klure and Maple Grove have demonstrated that Maple Grove satisfies both prongs of 
Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2). Therefore, the trial court erred by denying Maple Grove's motion for 
partial summary judgment and by dismissing Maple Grove's claim for business damages. 
Instead, the trial court should have held that Maple Grove is a qualifying business under Idaho 
Code $7-71 l(2) and permitted it to prove its business damages reasonably caused by the Project. 
D. ACHD's Purchase of Dr. Curtis's Property was a Taking. 
The trial court held that Maple Grove cannot prove an entitlement to business damages 
under Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) because ACHD purchased the property from Dr. Curtis. Maple 
Grove concedes that no taking took place with regard to any of the purchased property that was 
not actually used in connection with the Project. However, focusing only on the property along 
Ustick Road that was actually used for the Project, which is currently part of Ustick Road and the 
sidewalk, and which adjoins the property where Maple Grove operated, it is plain that a taking of 
Dr. Curtis's property occurred. 
While there is no Idaho case law addressing the issue, courts from other jurisdictions and 
other authorities are unequivocal in stating that a negotiated purchase of property that is used by 
a governmental entity for a public purpose is considered a taking. This issue generally arises in 
connection with the rights of a lessee in the condemned property. 
A deed in lieu of condemnation is treated at a 
"condemnation proceeding" in most instances, even though a 
formal lawsuit is not filed. Thus, a lease termination clause that is 
triggered by a condemnation proceeding is also triggered by 
conveyance of the property by deed in lieu of condemnation. . . . 
Property acquired amicably in lieu of condemnation is treated as 
though it were taken through an eminent domain proceeding, 
entitling the affected party to relocation costs. 
7 Nichols on Eminent Domain 5 G6.02[1] (3d ed. 1981). 
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The Nevada Supreme Court addressed this issue in Fuddy Duddy 's v. State Dept. of , 
Transp., 950 P.2d 773 (Nevada 1997), which involved a claim by a tenant following the sale of 
the property to the state transportation department. In that case, the tenant argued that the 
acquisition of the property by the government was not a taking because it occurred via negotiated 
purchase, which meant that the lease was not terminated pursuant to its condemnation clause. 
After citing cases from several other jurisdictions, the court held: 
We are persuaded by the above authorities and conclude 
that a purchase made under the threat of condemnation is the same 
as a judicial condemnation. This was not a sale on the open market. 
The Board of Directors of NDOT adopted a resolution authorizing 
and directing NDOT to acquire the Deebs' property on Industrial 
Road, including that leased by Eliades. The negotiation between 
NDOT and the Deebs appears to be a good faith effort to agree on 
the amount of compensation. Therefore, we conclude that the 
district court did not err in concluding that the condemnation 
clauses terminated Eliades' leases. 
Id, 950 P.2d at775. See also P.C. Management, Inc. v. Page Two, Inc., 573 N.E.2d 434,437 
(1nd.App. 1991) ("We are persuaded by out-of-state authority that a conveyance in lieu of actual 
condemnation of real property constitutes a condemnation proceeding because it indicates an 
intention to acquire the property by condemnation and is tantamount to a taking under the power 
of eminent domain."); Lanning v. City of Monterey, 226 Cal.Rptr. 258,262 (Cal.Ct.App. 1986) 
(Affirmed trial court's finding that sale of property to city was the essential equivalent of its 
exercise of eminent domain); Vincent v. Redev. Auth., Etc., 487 A.2d 1024, 1025 
(Pa.Comw.Ct. 1985) (events culminating in a conveyance by deed in lieu of condemnation 
constituted a "condemnation proceeding"). 
Furthermore, AeHD's general counsel admitted that "[bly reaching the settlement 
agreement with Dr. Curtis for the purchase of his Property, ACHD accomplished its goal of 
acquiring property by agreement, rather than through condemnation." R.., Exh. 7,152. 
While ACHD ultimately acquired the property via negotiated purchase, this was not a 
sale on the open market. The property was not for sale prior to the Project. Maple Grove 
intended to remain in its original location and would have done so were it not for the Project. 
The only reason the sale occurred was because of the Project and ACHD's statutory duty to 
negotiate for property needed for a public purpose. Idaho Code $7-707(7). Holding otherwise 
places the right of a business to recover damages under Section 7-1 1 l(2) in the hands of the 
governmental entity and the property owner. The government would be motivated to over pay 
for the real property in order to avoid having to compensate the business. This result would 
fmstrate the intent of the Idaho Legislature. 
The determination that the portion of Dr. Curtis's real property that was actually needed 
for the Project was the subject of a taking by ACHD triggers the business damages provisions of 
Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2). Because there was a taking of that portion of Dr. Curtis's property, 
Maple Grove is entitled to recover its business damages, and the trial court erred when it 
dismissed Maple Grove's claim. 
E. Maple Grove's Interest in the Property Was Taken by ACIID 
Pursuant to this Court's decision in Seubert, Maple Grove is not required to prove a 
taking of its property interest in order to establish a right to business damages under Idaho Code 
5 7-71 l(2). However, assuming arguendo that such a showing is necessary, the undisputed facts 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 14 
in the record prove that a property interest of Maple Grove was the subject of a taking as a result 
of ACHD's acquisition of real property for the Project. 
Both the Idaho Constitution and United States Constitution require the government to 
give just compensation for private property taken for public uses. Idaho Const. art. I, 5 14; U.S. 
Const. amend. V. The plain language of these constitutional provisions require: 
[Tlhe payment of compensation whenever the government 
acquires private property for a public purpose, whether the 
acquisition is the result of a condemnation proceeding or a physical 
appropriation. 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,321 
There is a long standing distinction between the rules used to analyze physical takings as 
compared to those used to analyze regulatory takings. 
A physical taking occurs when the government's action amounts to 
a physical occupation or invasion of the property, including the 
functional equivalent of a practical ouster of the [owner's] 
possession. 
Tulare Lake Basin Storage Dist. v. US., 49 Fed. C1. 313, 318 (2001) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
When the government physically takes possession of an interest in 
property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to 
compensate the former owner regardless of whether the interest 
that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof. 
Thus, compensation is mandated when a leasehold is taken and the 
government occupies the property for its own purposes, even 
though that use is temporary. 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 322. This categorical duty to compensate 
for a physical taking arises "no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the 
public purpose behind it." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 
When the government takes a fee simple interest in property, it also takes any lesser 
interests in the property taken. A. W. Duckett & Co. v. US., 266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924). Any 
arrangement the govement may make with a property owner concerning compensation for the 
property taken, does not affect a tenant's right to be compensated for its leasehold interest. A. W. 
Duckett & Co., 266 U.S. at 15 1. ACHD's appropriation of the property that it needed for the 
Project terminated Maple Grove's leasehold estate. The fact that this appropriation occurred via 
the ACHDICurtis Settlement as opposed to a judicial condemnation proceeding is of no moment. 
ACHD has taken Maple Grove's leasehold estate without paying the full measure of just 
compensation for it. 
As to trial court's conclusion that there was no taking of Maple Grove's property interest 
because ACHD did not need any portion of the properly leased by Maple Grove for the 
completion of the project, we need only look to the settlement agreement that ACHD entered 
into with Dr. Curtis. Therein, it states: 
WHEREAS, in connection with the Project, ACHD needs to 
acquire a portion of each of the Office Parcel, Parcel 45 and 
Parcel 44: and 
WHEREAS, ACHD has offered to purchase Curtises' interest in 
the Properties as a settlement and accommodation of all of Curtis' 
claims, both as an owner of the properties and as a fifty percent 
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(50%) member of Curtis-Klure. This settlement is intended to 
resolve and forever extinguish any all claims and disputes 
between ACHD and Curtis, including their interest in Curtis- 
Klure." 
R., Exh. 6, f 8 (emphasis added). The legal description of the "Office Parcel" referenced in the 
ACHDICurtis Settlement is exactly the same as the description of the property leased by Maple 
Grove - Lot 19, Block 1 of Fairbanks Subdivision. Thus, ACHD clearly stated in the 
ACHDICurtis Settlement that it did in fact need a portion of the "Office Parcel" in connection 
with the Project. 
Further, even though the real property that ACHD needed for the Project did not include 
the actual building occupied by Maple Grove, the property taken by ACHD and actually used for 
the Project included property rights held by Maple Grove under the lease. Lot 19 is part of 
Fairbanks Subdivision and therefore subject to the rights and obligations under the Declaration 
of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Fairbanks Subdivision. Lot 16 of that subdivision 
consists of the common areas and parking lot for the office buildings in the subdivision. 
Pursuant to those declarations, "Said Lot 16 is reserved for open area, landscaping, driveways 
and parking areas, public utilities, fire and police protection access, drainage, irrigation, trash 
receptacles and oiher uses appurtenant to the office buildings located on Lot 17 through 20, 
Block 1." R., Exh. 8 , f2 .  This is also reflected in the Code of By-Laws of Maple Grove 
Professional Owners Association, Inc. "Each owner of all or any portion of Lots 17, 18, 19, and 
20 in the said FAIRBANKS SUBDIVISION shall have a permanent nonexclusive easement to 
use the Office Building Common Area [previously defined as Lot 16, Block 11 for purposes of 
ingress and egress from and to adjacent public streets, for automobile parking purposes, for 
utilities, and for trash receptacles, all subject to Rules and Regulations promulgated by this 
corporation as hereafter provided." Id., 7 3. 
It is clear ffom the materials submitted by ACHD that ACND did in fact need to 
physically occupy portions of Lot 16 in order to complete the road widening project, and it is 
undisputable that portions of Lot 16 are presently paved as part of Ustick Road and its sidewalk. 
Those portions of Lot 16 were, therefore, taken for a public use. By taking portions of Lot 16, 
ACHD took a property interest that was appurtenant to Lot 19, which was leased by Maple 
Grove. 
This is similar to the claim addressed by the court in Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dept. of 
Transp., 839 So.2d 727 (Fla.App.2 dist., 2003). In that case, the Florida Department of 
Transportation condemned a portion of a shopping center including some of the parking space. 
Winn-Dixie leased space in the shopping center and asserted that it was entitled to a portion of 
the settlement agreement proceeds between the department and the shopping center owner for 
the taking of its leasehold interest in the condemned property. Id. at 728. The shopping center 
owner argued that Winn-Dixie's leasehold interest did not include the parking area that was 
taken. The lease described the premises as only the building and the land on which it stood. The 
court rejected that argument. 
The lease, taken as a whole, contemplates a leasehold interest of 
the common areas of the shopping center. First, the lease refers to 
the leased premises as the "store building and related 
improvements." "Related improvements" include the 
specifications for the parking area which require a minimum ratio 
of 4.85 parking spaces per 1,000 square feet of building area. 
Second, the tenns of the Lease indicate that its continuation or 
termination was contingent upon the availability of that parking. 
Third, Winn-Dixie paid separate consideration ("'additional rent") 
for the monthly maintenance and repair for the parking area. The 
Lease required Winn-Dixie to pay .I0 per square foot "as 
additional rent" to assist the landlord in maintaining and repairing 
the common areas, including "general repair and maintenance of 
all paved surfaces [and] repainting of parking area striping." 
Therefore, when read as a whole, the expressed terms ofthe Lease 
indicate that Winn-Dixie bargained for an interest in the parking 
area of the shopping center. 
Id. at 730. 
In the present case, while the Maple Grove Lease does not explicitly refer to the parking 
area and other portions of Lot 16, the declarations of the subdivision and the by-laws of the 
owners association demonstrate that by leasing Lot 19, Maple Grove was also entitled to an 
easement for parking and access to Lot 16, portions of which are now part of Ustick Road, 
Maple Grove and their sidewalks. 
Going beyond the legal descriptions, one can easily see how the taking of real property 
needed for the road widening project would affect a business located in the office building on 
Lot 19. The new road and sidewalks are only a few feet from the office building. Access and 
parking were also significantly affected. All of these factors plainly played into ACND's 
decision to purchase Dr. Curtis' property outright rather than attempting to carve out sections of 
it and being liable for damages for the remainder. This is also clear from the fact that ACHD, in 
the settlement agreement, compensated Dr. Curtis for his share of business damages sustained by 
Maple Grove. If Maple Grove was not a qualifying business under section 7-71 1 andlor there 
was no taking of property that affected a property interest of Maple Grove, then there would 
have been no reason for ACHD to compensate Dr. Curtis.for his share of Maple Grove's 
business damages. 
F. Maple Grove is Entitled to Recover Business Damages Reasonably Caused by the 
Taking, Including Relocation Costs 
While a discussion of the nature and amount of damages that may be recoverable by 
Maple Grove in this action is premature, ACHD argued in response to the motion for partial 
summary judgment, and the trial court agreed, that Maple Grove has no right to recover business 
damages because Dr. Klure relocated his practice and the expense of the relocation is not 
compensable. This position is contrary to the plain language of the statute and this Court's 
decision in Seubert. In that case, the government made exactly the same argument that ACHD 
made in this case -that relocation costs are not recoverable as business damages under section 
7-71 l(2). The Seubert court held: 
Idaho Code § 7-71 1 does not attempt to define a limit of what 
damages are allowable under the statute, but rather refers to 
damages generally, providing for damages to any business "which 
the taking of a portion of any property . . . may reasonably cause." 
LC. 5 7-71 l(2). The language in I.C. 5 7-71 1(2)(b), on which the 
City relies, does not preclude an award of relocation costs. It 
mainly serves to prevent a business from sitting on the condemned 
property and claiming business damages that could have been 
mitigated by relocating. 
Id. at 586, 130 P.3d 1124. Thus, relocation costs are potentially recoverable in this action if Dr. 
Klure can prove that those costs were reasonable caused by the Project. Whether the relocation 
costs were caused by the Project and, if so, in what amount, are issues that were not presented to 
the trial court during the summary judgment proceedings, and questions of fact preclude any 
determination of those issues at this time.3 
G. Maple Grove is Entitled to Recover Its Attorney Fees on Appeal if it Prevails in the 
Action 
Idaho law is clear that a condemnee is entitled to recover its attorney fees in an eminent 
domain or inverse condemnation action if the condemnor does not reasonably make a timely 
offer of settlement of at least ninety percent of the ultimate jury verdict. Ada County Highway 
District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 877,673 P.2d 1067, 1071 (1983). This also applies to 
qualifying businesses that are entitled to damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2). Seubert at 587, 
130 P.3d at 1 125. Therefore, upon remand, if Maple Grove prevails in this action and recovers 
business damages against ACHD, then it will be entitled to its fees and costs, including those 
incurred this appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-718 and I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(l)(B). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Idaho's eminent domain statute contains the clearly expressed intent of the Idaho 
Legislature to compensate qualifying businesses that are damaged by the taking of real property 
for public use. The undisputed facts in the record show that ACHD needed to acquire property at 
the intersection of Ustick and Maple Grove for the Project, including property owned by Dr. 
Curtis and subject to the lease between Dr. Curtis and Maple Grove. By acquiring the property 
for use in the Project, ACHD triggered the application of Idaho Code 5 7-7 1 l(2) and must 
It is ironic that one of the grounds for the trial court's decision to dismiss Maple Grove's claims in this 
case is that Dr. Klure had relocated his practice prior to the actual date that the property was purchased 
given the fact that this Court observed in Seubert that a qualifying business has a duty to mitigate its 
damages by relocating when necessary. 
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. compensate any qualifying business for the damages reasonably caused by the taking. Maple 
Grove is a qualifling business by virtue of being located upon adjoining property owned by the 
Dr. Curtis. In addition, ACHD infringed upon Maple Grove's leasehold interest when it 
acquired property for the Project. Maple Grove should be permitted to proceed with proof of the 
damages reasonably caused by the Project. 
For these reasons, Maple Grove respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and remand this action with the instruction that partial summary judgment be 
entered in Maple Grove's favor on the issue of Maple Grove's right to recover any business 
damages that it can prove were reasonably caused by the Project. 
DATED This a" day of December, 2009, 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
B 
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